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Introduction 
Under Social Security, married individuals are 
entitled to a retired worker benefit based on their own 
earnings and/or to a spousal benefit equal to one half 
of their spouse’s benefit claimed at the Full Retire-
ment Age (currently 66).  If a married individual 
claims before the Full Retirement Age, the Social 
Security Administration assumes that the individual 
is claiming both types of benefits, compares the 
worker and spousal benefits, and awards the highest.  
Upon reaching the Full Retirement Age, individu-
als can choose which benefit to receive.  As a result, 
married individuals can claim a spousal benefit at 
66 and switch to their own retired worker benefit at 
a later date.  This approach allows a worker to begin 
claiming one type of benefit while still building up de-
layed retirement credits, which will result in a higher 
worker benefit later. 
In the past, providing these benefit options for 
spouses was not particularly valuable, since those who 
postponed benefits beyond the Full Retirement Age 
were giving up expected lifetime benefits.  With the 
recent advent of an actuarially fair delayed retirement 
credit, lifetime benefits are roughly the same whether 
claimed at the Full Retirement Age or at age 70.  As a 
result, today the availability of benefit options has real 
value for couples and therefore inevitably increases 
the cost of the Social Security program. 
This brief describes how the procedure can benefit 
married couples, estimates how much it could cost 
the Social Security Administration on an annual 
basis, and characterizes those most likely to take 
advantage of the option.  The conclusion is that the 
procedure could cost as much as $9.5 billion per year 
and a significant amount of that additional money 
would go to households in the upper portion of the 
income distribution.
Calculating Spousal Benefits
Under current law, married individuals are entitled to 
retired worker benefits based on their own earnings 
or, if they have no earnings, they receive 50 percent of 
their spouses’ Primary Insurance Amount (PIA).  If 
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spousal benefit while using “claim now, claim more 
later” are the husbands in two-earner couples.  The 
reason stems from the results of an earlier study that 
showed married women will maximize the couple’s 
expected lifetime benefits by claiming early.1  The 
intuition for this somewhat counter-intuitive finding 
is that women’s planning horizon for how long they 
will receive their own retired worker benefit is from 
the date of their retirement to their husband’s death.  
When their husband dies, they are entitled to their 
husband’s benefit as a widow.  Therefore, optimal 
claiming in most cases has the woman claiming ben-
efits at 62 and the husband delaying until 69.2  As a 
result, the way an optimizing couple would use “claim 
now, claim more later” is for the wife to claim at 62 
and, once her husband reaches age 66, he would 
claim a spouse’s benefit based on his wife’s earnings.  
At age 69, he would claim the maximum amount 
of his own retired worker benefit due to the delayed 
retirement credits, and stop receiving the spousal 
benefit.  Of course, if the woman is the higher earner, 
the story works in reverse.  
The Cost of “Claim Now, 
Claim More Later”
One can get a rough idea of the potential annual cost 
by considering how many participants are eligible to 
use this strategy and how much they will gain from 
it.  In 2006, roughly 650,000 husbands had higher 
earnings’ histories than their wives.3  The typical 
wife’s Primary Insurance Amount – the unreduced 
benefit that serves as the basis of the spousal ben-
efit – is about $900, so the husband would have 
received 50 percent of $900 for 36 months for a total 
of $16,200.  Multiplying the number of men eligible 
(650,000) times $16,200 yields a total cost of $10.5 
billion.  Doing the same exercise for the 10 percent of 
cases – roughly 80,000 – where the wife has higher 
earnings than the husband yields an additional cost 
of $1.3 billion.   Thus, a rough estimate of the annual 
cost incurred by households making their joint claim-
ing decisions is about $11.8 billion.4
A more sophisticated approach to estimating the 
total cost to the program is to compare for each cou-
ple their optimal claiming ages and value of benefits 
under conventional claiming and under a scenario 
where “claim now, claim more later” is added to their 
options.  This approach allows for couples with differ-
ent age differences and different ratios of husband’s 
to wife’s earnings.  
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they have some earnings, the spousal benefit is used 
to “top up” the worker benefit so that the total equals 
50 percent of the spouse’s.  The amount can be lower 
if the individual chooses to receive either the retired 
worker benefit or the spouse’s benefit before the Full 
Retirement Age (see Table 1).  However, spouses’ ben-
efits are not affected by the age at which the worker-
beneficiary claims benefits.  
Table 1. Spouse’s Benefits as a Percent of the 
Worker’s PIA
Source: U.S. Social Security Administration (2009).
Full Retirement 
Age
  Claiming own/spouse’s benefit at:
62 65 66 67 70
62 in 1999 37.5 50 50 50 50
62 in 2005-2016 35 45.8 50 50 50
62 in  2022 32.5 41.7 45.8 50 50
% % % % %
Prior to reaching the Full Retirement Age (FRA), 
when a married individual files for benefits, he or she 
is subject to a “deemed filing” provision.  Under this 
provision, it is assumed that the individual is filing 
for both the spousal benefit and the benefit based on 
his/her earnings record.  The Social Security Admin-
istration then compares the two benefits and awards 
the higher.  After reaching the FRA, deemed filing 
no longer applies, giving the individual the ability to 
choose which benefit he or she receives. 
Originally, we thought that “claim now, claim 
more later” would involve the wife receiving the spou-
sal benefit in two-earner couples with roughly equal 
earnings.  For example, consider a two-earner couple 
in which the husband is three years older than the 
wife (the typical age difference according to the Health 
and Retirement Study).  Both husband and wife had 
originally planned to delay claiming until age 70 in 
order to receive the highest possible monthly benefit.  
But, instead, once the husband claims his benefits at 
age 70, the wife – now 67 and no longer subject to 
deeming – can file for just a spousal benefit.  The wife 
then continues working and contributing to Social 
Security.  At age 70, she files for her own retired 
worker benefit, which has now reached its maximum 
amount due to the delayed retirement credits, and 
stops receiving the spousal benefit.  In this situation, 
the wife gains three years of spousal benefits that she 
would not have enjoyed under the conventional claim-
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The analysis uses the 2006 Health and Retire-
ment Study (HRS) and focuses on the joint claiming 
decision that married couples would make when 
the eldest member is 62 in order to maximize their 
expected lifetime benefits.5  First, using life tables that 
vary by gender, race and education, we calculate the 
total expected benefits, including survivor benefits, 
paid to each household at each possible combination 
of claiming ages under conventional claiming strate-
gies.6  We identify the couple’s combination of claim-
ing ages that yields the highest expected benefits.  
Second, we expand the options available to the couple 
by adding the possibility of “claim now, claim more 
later.”  This expansion is accomplished by restricting 
first one member and then the other member of the 
couple from claiming benefits until he or she is 66, 
at which point he or she claims benefits based on the 
spouse’s earnings record.  
In order to claim benefits on the spouse’s earnings 
record, the spouse also must have claimed benefits.  
But a new provision – “claim and suspend” – allows 
individuals who want to continue working upon 
reaching the FRA to claim their benefits and then 
suspend payment, so that their spouses may receive 
spousal benefits while their own worker benefits can 
increase with additional earnings and the delayed 
retirement credit.  The ability to claim and suspend 
was assumed for both the base case and the expanded 
scenario.7  
The next step in the analysis is simply to com-
pare for each household the total amount of benefits 
paid under the conventional strategies and the total 
amount paid under the expanded options that include 
“claim now, claim more later.”  If the difference is 
negative, we assume the couple will not use the strat-
egy and the cost to Social Security is zero.  If the dif-
ference is positive, we assume the couple will use the 
strategy and impose a cost on Social Security.  To get 
a total number for the population, HRS weights were 
applied to get the average for men and for women.  
The annual cost to Social Security is then calculated 
by multiplying those averages by the actual number of 
men and women aged 62 in the 2006 Current Popula-
tion Survey.
The conventional strategy would have produced 
maximum benefits of $349.5 billion for married 
couples in 2006, while the expanded options would 
have produced maximum benefits of $359.0 billion 
(see Figure 1).8  The potential annual cost to Social 
Security is thus $9.5 billion.  This figure is close to 
the “back of the envelope” estimate described above.9    
Who Gains from “Claim Now, 
Claim More Later”?
The final issue is who gains from the availability of 
the option to claim spousal benefits and then claim 
their own.  Some obvious criteria include: 1) the indi-
viduals must be married; 2) at least one member of 
the couple must be healthy enough to delay claiming 
until 66; and 3) both spouses must have an earnings 
history.  The higher and the more equal the earnings 
records, the more to gain.  Figure 2 shows that the 
Figure 1. Maximum Benefits Paid by Social 
Security Under the Two Strategies, 2006 
Dollars (Billions) 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on University of Michi-
gan, Health and Retirement Study (HRS), 2006; and U.S. 











Using "claim now, claim more
later" strategy
Figure 2. Potential Gain from “Claim Now, Claim 
More Later” Strategy by Wealth Quintiles, 2006 
Dollars (Billions)










Lowest Second Third Fourth Highestpotential benefits from “claim now, claim more later” 
are relatively evenly distributed, though they some-
what favor households in the top two quintiles of the 
wealth distribution.  These higher-wealth households 
receive over 45 percent of the total benefits.  Figure 
3 shows that the more equal the earnings between 
spouses, the greater the relative gain. 
Conclusion
This financial crisis has demonstrated the importance 
of Social Security as the backbone of the retirement 
income system.  Thus, restoring balance to the Social 
Security program, which faces a deficit over the next 
75 years, should be a high priority.  This process will 
involve careful scrutiny of all provisions to assess 
whether they are consistent with the basic goals of 
the program.  It is not clear what public policy goal 
the “claim now, claim more later” option addresses.  
Moreover, the main beneficiaries are two-earner 
couples, and a significant portion of the benefits goes 
to those with higher incomes.  The potential cost in 
2006 was about $9.5 billion.  This cost will climb 
sharply as large numbers of baby-boom couples start 
retiring.  
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Figure 3. Potential Gain as a Percent of Higher 
Earner’s PIA, by PIA Ratio
Note: This calculation assumes: (1) a three-year age differ-
ence between the older, higher earner and his spouse, and 
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Endnotes
1  Munnell and Soto (2005).
2  Technically, these ages apply in circumstances 
when the wife’s Primary Insurance Amount is equal 
to 40 percent or more of the husband’s (see Munnell 
and Soto 2005).
3  We find that couples will not gain from this strategy 
if the lower earner’s PIA is less than about 30 percent 
of the higher earner’s PIA. 
4  Discounting the benefits back to age 62 would 
reduce the total to $10.2 billion. 
5  Because of the low number of couples reaching 
age 62, we augmented our sample size to get a more 
reliable estimation.  See Appendix for further explana-
tion.
6  Our calculations are based on the 1948 cohort 
life table.  The socioeconomic survival rates come 
from Brown, Liebman, and Pollet (2002), which 
determines relative survival probabilities for 12 race-
gender-education groups.  If an individual did not fall 
into one of the 12 groups, they were assigned gender-
specific cohort mortality.
7  To understand the effects of the “claim and sus-
pend” provision, we calculated the cost to Social Secu-
rity both with and without its use.  Under convention-
al claiming behavior, “claim and suspend” increases 
total lifetime benefits by about $1 billion.  Because 
“claim and suspend” is primarily used by couples with 
low PIA ratios, its use only marginally affects those 
who would normally use the “claim now, claim more 
later” strategy. 
8  We assume that, under the conventional strat-
egy, couples claim benefits at the optimal ages that 
maximize their expected lifetime benefits.  In reality, 
men and women tend to claim early (see Sass, Sun 
and Webb, 2008, and Munnell and Soto, 2005).  Sass, 
Sun, and Webb demonstrate that individuals forfeit 
roughly 4 percent of the value by claiming at subop-
timal ages.  If we use actual claiming behavior as the 
base case, rather than optimal behavior using con-
ventional strategies, the potential cost would be about 
$23.5 billion rather than $9.5 billion. 
9  The expanded claiming options produce a shift in 
the optimal claiming age for the high earner from 69 
to 70.  Therefore, one would expect the optimization 
calculation to yield a higher value than the “back-of 
the-envelope,” since the higher-earning spouse would 
be receiving spousal benefits for four years instead 
of the three years used in the example.  One would 
expect improved survivor benefits would also make 
the optimization calculation higher than the “back-of 
the-envelope.”  This is not the case.  Of the possible 
reasons, the clearest is that the “back of the envelope” 
calculation does not take the “claim and suspend” 
provision into account.Center for Retirement Research 6
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ssa.gov/planners.APPENDIXAppendix: Calculation of the Cost of the “Claim Now, Claim 
More Later” Strategy
The analysis is based on 1,006 couples with the eldest member between the ages of 62 and 70 in the 2006 
Health and Retirement Study (HRS).  The HRS restricted and self-reported earnings data make it possible to 
calculate Social Security’s Primary Insurance Amounts (PIAs).  The PIA is used to calculate the cumulative 
lifetime benefits earned by couples based on their joint retirement ages.  (To estimate steady-state annual costs, 
we assumed a Full Retirement Age of 66 and delayed retirement credits of 8 percent for each year benefits are 
postponed.  The analysis also assumes that individuals attempt to maximize benefits paid to their household 
and, consequently, couples make cooperative claiming decisions.)   
     The first step is to determine each couple’s optimal claiming ages and subsequent lifetime benefits under 
conventional claiming methods – without the use of the “claim now, claim more later” strategy.  We treat each 
couple as if the eldest member is 62 and compute potential benefits at each age discounted for probability of 
survival and interest.  Based on 1948 cohort life tables, we then use relative mortality rates for 12 gender-race-
education categories from Brown, Liebman, and Pollet (2002) to calculate the total expected benefits paid to 
each household at each combination of possible claiming ages, taking expected survivor benefits into account 
as well.   
     For the husband’s claiming age of i and the wife’s claiming age of j, total expected benefits, TotBij, is equal to: 
where BenHi  is the benefit received by the husband, probHx  is the probability that the husband is alive at time 
x, Survij the survivor benefit paid to the surviving spouse, BenWj is the benefit received by the wife, and probWy 
is the probability that the wife is alive at time y.  If an individual is eligible for both personal and spousal 
benefits, he or she will receive the larger of the two.  We then identify the couple’s combination of claiming 
ages that yield the highest expected lifetime benefits, and assume it to be their optimal claiming strategy under 
conventional behavior.   
     The second step is to determine each couple’s optimal claiming ages and subsequent lifetime benefits when 
using the “claim now, claim more later” strategy.  To introduce this strategy, we restrict one member of the cou-
ple from claiming benefits until he or she reaches age 66 and assume that, during each year that the individual 
delays claiming after age 66, he or she will receive a spousal benefit based on the spouse’s earnings record.  
Because this is a joint decision, we allow for the possibility that either the individual age 62 or his spouse will 
be the one receiving spousal benefits while earning delayed retirement credits.  When the husband uses this 
strategy, the total expected benefits paid to the household, TotB´Hij, will be:
          
where SpsH is the spousal benefit that the husband is entitled to based on his wife’s earnings record.  If the wife 
uses this strategy, the total expected benefits paid to the household TotB´Wij, will be:
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(BenWj * probWy * probHy + Survij * (1- probHy) * probWy)









(BenHi * probHx * probWx + Survij * (1- probWx) * probHx)
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where SpsW is the spousal benefit that the wife is entitled to based on her husband’s earnings record.  We as-
sume the couple will use whichever strategy yields the higher expected household benefit. 
     The third step involves, for each couple, subtracting the expected lifetime benefits paid under the conven-
tional claiming strategy from the expected lifetime benefits paid under the “claim now, claim more later” strat-
egy.  If the difference is negative, we assume that the couple will not use the strategy and there will be a zero 
net cost to Social Security.  If the difference is positive, we assume that the couple will use the strategy and the 
gain over the conventional claiming behavior is the cost incurred by that couple to Social Security.  
     Finally, the HRS weights were then applied to calculate average gains made by couples when using this 
strategy.  The total cost to Social Security is then found by multiplying those averages by the actual number of 
couples in which the eldest member is aged 62 from the 2006 Current Population Survey.
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